


Democratizing Privacy-Preserving Computation

Anwar Hithnawi

ETH zürich

Data Driven World



Sensitive Data



Smart Homes



Genetics



Dating



Geolocation



Finance



Health



Government



Personal

PARTNER CONTENT JORIS TOONDERS, YONEGO

WIRED

DATA IS THE NEW OIL OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY

INNOVATION

**Why Big Data Is The New
Natural Resource *Forbes***

How Artificial Intelligence Could
Transform Medicine



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WIRED

DATA IS THE NEW OIL OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY

INNOVATION

Why Big Data Is The New Natural Resource **Forbes**

How Artificial Intelligence Could Transform Medicine **T**



You Should Be Freaking Out About Privacy

Nothing to hide, nothing to fear? Think again.



Grindr and OkCupid Spread Personal Details, Study Says

Norwegian research raises questions about whether certain ways of sharing of information violate data privacy laws in Europe and the United States. **wp**

Data Breaches Keep Happening. So Why Don't You Do Something? **T**

Technology

Data broker shared billions of location records with District during pandemic

The bulk sales of location data have fueled a debate over public health and privacy **wp**

~ 1.245 Billion

The number of data records
stolen in 2020

~ 1.245 Billion

The number of data records
stolen in 2020

143,000,000

EQUIFAX

2017

57,000,000

Uber

2017

330,000,000




2018

533,000,000




2019


Data Protection: An Age-Old Concern




Data Protection: An Age-Old Concern




Data Protection: An Age-Old Concern



Data Protection: An Age-Old Concern




Data Protection: An Age-Old Concern




Securing Data: Building Blocks




Securing Data: Building Blocks




Securing Data: Building Blocks



Securing Data: Building Blocks




Securing Data: Building Blocks




End-to-End Encrypted Applications
More Applications?


Securing Data in Use: Modern Applications




Securing Data in Use: Modern Applications




Securing Data in Use: Modern Applications




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
End-to-End Security




End-to-End Security




End-to-End Security




~ 40 Years of History




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


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


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
Blockchain




Private Set Intersection



Census




Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning




Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning


Private Machine Learning as a Service




Private Machine Learning as a Service



Private Machine Learning as a Service




Private Machine Learning as a Service



Solving tasks where data is **accessible...**

Tasks

WikiText-103
ImageNet WMT MNIST
GPT-3 CIFAR



Public Data

Crowdsourced Data

For example: web, books, articles, science, TV, corpus,
audiobooks, ...

Solving tasks where data is
accessible...

... however, many important tasks we
care about ...

Tasks

Inaccessible

WikiText-103
ImageNet
GPT-3
WMT
MNIST
CIFAR

Health – Cancer, Alzheimer, Dementia, Depression
Finance – Economic growth, Market predictions
Government – Education, Taxes, Immigration, Income
Personal Data – Text Messages, Emails, Photos

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Tasks

WikiText-103
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GPT-3
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Public Data


Crowdsourced Data

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Inaccessible

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Data Silos

- Privacy Laws
- Competition

Solving tasks where data is
accessible...

Tasks

WikiText-103

MNIST

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CIFAR

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
Health – Cancer, Alzheimer, Dementia, Depression

Finance – Economic growth, Market predictions

Government – Education, Taxes, Immigration, Income

Personal Data – Text Messages, Emails, Photos


→ EU Data Governance Act (DGA) effective from 2023
facilitate the reuse of protected public-sector data




Data Silos

- Privacy Laws
- Competition

Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning




Theory to Practice: Barriers to Broad Adoption



Performance Gap


Practical for numerous applications but remains beyond reach for constrained use cases.



Complexity


There's a gap between the capabilities of PETs today and organizations' ability to incorporate them into applications.

Theory to Practice: Barriers to Broad Adoption



Performance Gap

Practical for numerous applications but remains beyond reach for constrained use cases.





Complexity

There's a gap between the capabilities of PETs today and organizations' ability to incorporate them into applications.


Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Enables **computation** on encrypted data




Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Enables **computation** on encrypted data




Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Enables **computation** on encrypted data




Delegate the **processing** of data without giving away **access** to it


40 Years of FHE History




40 Years of FHE History




40 Years of FHE History



40 Years of FHE History



Fully Homomorphic Encryption



Real-world use Started to Emerge



Apple Live Caller ID Lookup
(Private Information Retrieval)




Microsoft Edge Password Monitor
(Private Set Intersection)

FHE Commercialization




Hardware Acceleration for FHE



GPU




FPGA




ASIC



Fully Homomorphic Encryption




Fully Homomorphic Encryption



Graph Adapted from Kristin Lauter, Talk @PriCon2020


Performance Gap

Fully Homomorphic Encryption



Approach to Efficiency

Empower
Constrained
Environments
with Encrypted
Data Processing.



Encrypted Data Processing Systems

DBMS




CryptDB

Blind Seer

Arx

...

Analytics




Seabed

Seanat

Conclave

...

Machine Learning



Arc

Helen

RoFL

...

Streaming



TimeCrypt

Zeph

Waldo

...

Internet of Things



Talos

Pilatus

Kryptein

...

...

Encrypted Data Processing Systems




CryptDB

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Internet of Things



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Encrypted Data Processing Systems




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Internet of Things



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Encrypted Data Processing Systems




CryptDB

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


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Internet of Things



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Talos

Pilatus

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Encrypted Data Processing Systems




CryptDB

Blind Seer

Arx

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Internet of Things



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
Approach to Efficiency

Pros.


- enhanced performance
- targeted functionality

Cons.


- limited flexibility
- poor interoperability



Theory to Practice: Barriers to Broad Adoption




Performance Gap




Complexity

Theory to Practice: Barriers to Broad Adoption



Performance Gap




Complexity


Developing and Deploying Privacy-preserving Applications is
Notoriously Hard

What does “developing these applications” entail?


Conventional Cryptography




Conventional Cryptography




Secure Communication




Conventional Cryptography



Secure Communication




Secure Storage




Advanced Cryptography: Secure Computation


f



Crypto 



Data Oblivious




Arithmetization




Noise

Advanced Cryptography: Secure Computation


f



Crypto



Data Oblivious



Arithmetization



Noise

Functionality and performance depend on f 's representation:

- How do we express f
- How do we optimize f

Usable Fully Homomorphic Encryption

(IEEE S&P'21, USENIX Security'23)

Usable FHE

Advanced
Cryptography




Programming
Languages

1 What makes developing FHE applications hard?
[IEEE S&P'21]


2 How can compilers address these complexities?
[USENIX Security'23]

Fully Homomorphic Encryption Programming Paradigm



```
void hd(vector<sbool>u,  
vector<sbool>v)  
{  
  sint sum =  
  for(int i = 0; i < v.size(); ++i)  
  {  
    sum += (v[i] != u[i]);  
  }  
}
```

f



Data Oblivious


```
void hd(vector<sbbool>u,
        vector<sbbool>v)
{
  sint sum =
  for(int i < v.size();
```

Worse-than-Worst-Case Runtime

```
if (c) {
  // 🐰
} else {
  // 🐢
}
// 🐢


t = // 🐰
f = // 🐢
if = c*t + (1-c)*f

O(🐰) → O(🐰 + 🐢)
average      always
```




Data Oblivious

No (efficient) Random-Access Memory




```
void hd(vector<sbool>u,  
vector<sbool>v)  
{  
  sint sum =  
  for(int i < v.size();  
    ++i)  
  {  
    sum += [i]!=u[i];  
  }  
}
```

f





Data Oblivious



Arithmetization

```
void hd(vector<sbbool>u,
        vector<sbbool>v)
{
  sint sum =
  for(int i < v.size();
      ++i)
  {
    sum += [i]!=u[i];
  }
}
```



Data Oblivious




Arithmetization

```

void hd(vector<sbbool>u,
vector<sbbool>v)
{
  sint sum =
  for(int
  i < v
  ++i)
  {
    sum +=
    [i]!=u[i];
  }
}

```

f




Data Oblivious


Arithmetization

```
void hd(vector<sbool>u,
        vector<sbool>v)
{
  sint sum =
  for(int i < v.size();
      ++i)
  {
    sum += [i]!=u[i];
  }
}
```


f



Data Oblivious




Arithmetization




Noise Management


```
void hd(vector<sbbool>u,
        vector<sbbool>v)
{
  sint sum =
  for(int i < v.size();
      ++i)
  {
    sum += [i]!=u[i];
  }
}
```

f



Data Oblivious




Arithmetization



Noise Management


FHE Noise Management

```
void f(...)  
{  
  ctxt ab = a*b + 3;  
  ctxt r = ab - z*z;  
  return r;  
}
```




FHE Noise Management

```
void f(...)  
{  
  ctxt ab = a*b + 3;  
  ctxt r = ab - z*z;  
  return r;  
}
```



FHE Noise Management

```
void f(...)  
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  ctxt ab = a*b + 3;  
  ctxt r = ab - z*z;  
  return r;  
}
```




| **Accessibility**


| FHE Developer Tooling

Evolution of FHE Tools


Evolution of FHE Tools



```
void f(...)  
{  
  mul_inp(a,b);  
  add_plain_inp(a,3)  
  square_inp(z,z);  
  sub_inp(a,z);  
  return a;  
}
```



Evolution of FHE Tools



```
void f(...)  
{  
  mul_inp(a,b);  
  relin_inp(a);  
  add_plain_inp(a,3)  
  square_inp(z,z);  
  relin_inp(a);  
  sub_inp(a,z);  
  return a;  
}
```

Implementing Gen
Encry

Algorithms in HElib

Shai
1. HM /
2. No

Abstract. We describe
the first fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) scheme
that supports arbitrary
polynomial operations on
encrypted data. We show
that our scheme is the
first to support all of the
operations of the
arithmetic circuit model
of computation. Our
scheme is based on the
learning with errors (LWE)
problem, which is believed
to be hard for quantum
computers. We show that
our scheme is secure under
the standard LWE assumption.
This result is a major
step towards the goal of
achieving fully homomorphic
encryption.

1. Intro


Homomorph
ic encryp
scheme to
in which
with ciphertexts.
We show
that our
scheme is
secure under
the standard
LWE assumption.
This result is
a major step
towards the goal
of achieving fully
homomorphic encryption.

Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library 2.3.1
Kilo Lattice
Microsoft Research, WA, USA. kilolattice@microsoft.com

1. Introduction


Traditional encryption schemes, both symmetric and asymmetric, were not designed to respect any algebraic structure of the plaintext and ciphertext spaces, i.e. no computation can be performed on the ciphertexts in a way that would pass through the encryption to the plaintext. In contrast, a homomorphic encryption scheme is designed to support computation on encrypted data without using the secret key, and such a property would be very useful in many contexts. In particular, homomorphic encryption schemes can be used to perform computations on encrypted data in the presence of a trusted third party (TTP) who does not learn the results of the computation. This is a powerful tool for many applications, e.g. in secure voting, secure auctions, and secure data analysis.

Evolution of FHE Tools




```

void f(...)
{
  mul_inp(a,b);
  relin_inp(a);
  add_plain_inp(a,3)
  square_inp(z,z);
  relin_inp(a);
  sub_inp(a,z);
  return a;
}
  
```



Evolution of FHE Tools



```
void f(...)  
{  
  ctxt ab = a*b + 3;  
  return ab - z*z;  
}
```

Implementing Gen
Encry

Algorithms in HElib

Shai
HElib /
2. Nov

Abstract. HElib
crypton (HE), a
scheme, based
padding technique
for HElib, in
homomorphic
scheme (or
can not be
reduced to a
homomorphic
scheme)

1. Intro


Homomorph
or crypton
scheme to
in which I
with ciphertext
This can
only be
morph!

Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library 2.3.1
Rico Laidin
Microsoft Research, WA, USA, rlaidin@microsoft.com

1. Introduction

Traditional encryption schemes, both symmetric and asymmetric, were not designed to respect any algebraic structure of the plaintext and ciphertext spaces, i.e. no computation can be performed on the ciphertexts in a way that would pass through the encryption to the plaintexts without using the secret key, and such a property would be very useful in many contexts (cloud) computation scenarios. Nevertheless, this property has powerful applications, e.g. in secure data privacy in the presence of both interest (multi-computers) and external (malicious) threats. An encryption scheme that allows computation on ciphertexts is called a homomorphic encryption scheme. In this paper we present a new homomorphic encryption scheme, i.e. one that allows computation on ciphertexts and external (malicious) threats. This scheme is based on the well-known Paillier encryption scheme, but it is more powerful. In particular, it supports arbitrary (fixed) multiplications on ciphertexts.

Evolution of FHE Tools



```
void f(...)  
{  
  ctxt ab = a*b + 3;  
  return ab - z*z;  
}
```

Implementing Gen
Encry
Critic

Algorithms in HElib

Shi
13M /
2, Nov

Simple Encrypted


Encrypt-Everything-Everywhere
ISA Extensions for Private Comput

Armadillo: A Compilation Chain for Privacy Preserving
Applications

Sergiu Carpov, Paul Dubrion, Renaud Sarda
from Chapter 12, 91-101 in the *VeriTrust Conference*
(sergiu.carpov, paul.dubrion, renaud.sarda@pau.fr)

Categories and Subject Descriptors
Security

Evolution of FHE Tools



```
void f(...)
{
  ctxt ab = a*b + 3;
  return ab - z*z;
}
```

Implementing Gen
Encry

Algorithms in HElib

Shi


Simple Encrypted

Encrypt-Everything-Everywhere
ISA Extensions for Private Comput


Armadillo: A Comp

EVA: An Encrypted Vector Arithmetic Language and
Compiler for Efficient Homomorphic Computation

Evolution of FHE Tools




```
void f(...)  
{  
  ctxt ab = a*b + 3;  
  return ab - z*z;  
}
```




Existing tools make important contributions,
but are very **narrowly focussed**



Developing FHE Applications





Developing FHE Applications







Circuit Optimizations



Crypto Optimizations




Target Optimizations



Individual Tooling

HECO


```
void hd(vector<bool>u,  
        vector<bool>v){  
    sint sum = 0;  
    for(int i = 0; i < u.size(); ++i)  
    {  
        sum += v[i] != u[i];  
    }  
}
```



Developer

SIMD-like Parallelism


Standard C++	Batched FHE
<pre>int[] foo(int[] x,int[] y){ int[] r; for(i = 0; i < 6; ++i){ r[i] = x[i] * y[i] } return r; }</pre>	<pre>int[] foo(int[] a,int[] b){ return a * b; }</pre>



No efficient free permutation or scatter/gather

SIMD-like Parallelism

Standard C++	Batched FHE
<pre>int[] foo(int[] x,int[] y){ int[] r; for(i = 0; i < 6; ++i){ r[i] = x[i] * y[i] } return r; }</pre>	<pre>int[] foo(int[] a,int[] b){ return a * b; }</pre>




No efficient free permutation or scatter/gather

Only cyclical rotations

SIMD-like Parallelism

Standard C++	Batched FHE
<pre>int[] foo(int[] x,int[] y){ int[] r; for(i = 0; i < 6; ++i){ r[i] = x[i] * y[i] } return r; }</pre>	<pre>int[] foo(int[] a,int[] b){ return a * b; }</pre>




No efficient free permutation or scatter/gather


Only cyclical rotations

SIMD-like Parallelism

Standard C++	Batched FHE
<pre>int[] foo(int[] x,int[] y){ int[] r; for(i = 0; i < 6; ++i){ r[i] = x[i] * y[i] } return r; }</pre>	<pre>int[] foo(int[] a,int[] b){ return a * b; }</pre>




No efficient free permutation or scatter/gather




Only cyclical rotations

SIMD-like Parallelism

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<pre>int[] foo(int[] x,int[] y){ int[] r; for(i = 0; i < 6; ++i){ r[i] = x[i] * y[i] } return r; }</pre>	<pre>int[] foo(int[] a,int[] b){ return a * b; }</pre>




No efficient free permutation or scatter/gather




Only cyclical rotations

SIMD-like Parallelism

Standard C++	Batched FHE
<pre>int[] foo(int[] x,int[] y){ int[] r; for(i = 0; i < 6; ++i){ r[i] = x[i] * y[i] } return r; }</pre>	<pre>int[] foo(int[] a,int[] b){ return a * b; }</pre>




No efficient free permutation or scatter/gather




Only cyclical rotations

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




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HECO: Transform High-level Programs to Efficient FHE Solutions





HECO: Transform High-level Programs to Efficient FHE Solutions



```
void hd(vector<sbool>u,  
vector<sbool>v){  
  sint sum = 0;  
  for(int i=0; i < u.size(); ++i){  
    {  
      sum += v[i]!=u[i];  
    }  
  }  
}
```



Developer



HECO: End-to-End FHE Compilation



End-to-End FHE Compilation

Standardizing the FHE Ecosystem

HEIR: Working Group on Compilers & Accelerators (heir.dev/community/)


- Open design meeting every two weeks
- Participants from across industry and academia
 - Companies: Google, Intel
 - Startups: Zama, Cryptolab
 - University: ETH Zurich, KU Leuven
 - Hardware developers: Optalysys, Niobium (Galois)



Meeting calendar




Future Directions in the Evolution of Secure Computation Tools




Secure Computation

Homomorphic Encryption | Secure Multi-party Computation | Zero Knowledge Proofs




Secure Computation

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


vFHE: Verifiable Fully Homomorphic Encryption. WAHC'24




Secure Computation


Homomorphic Encryption | Secure Multi-party Computation | Zero Knowledge Proofs



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


Hybrid Compilation




Secure Computation

Homomorphic Encryption | Secure Multi-party Computation | Zero Knowledge Proofs




Secure Computation

Homomorphic Encryption | Secure Multi-party Computation | Zero Knowledge Proofs




Releasing Data


Differential Privacy



End-to-End Privacy


Homomorphic Encryption | Secure Multi-party Computation | Zero Knowledge Proofs | Differential Privacy






Developer


Accessibility





Developer

Accessibility






Hybrid Compilation


FHE

ZKP


MPC



Mapping Guarantees to Secure
Primitives



Accessibility






Privacy-Transparency
Dichotomy




Hybrid Compilation






Mapping Guarantees to Secure
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Accessibility



Privacy-Transparency
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


Hybrid Compilation






User




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


System


Mapping Guarantees to Secure
Primitives



Accessibility



Composability



Privacy-Transparency
Dichotomy




Hybrid Compilation






User




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


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
Mapping Guarantees to Secure Primitives



Accessibility



Composability



Privacy-Transparency Dichotomy



Hybrid Compilation



Secure Computation on Heterogeneous Hardware



Work aims to **democratize access to privacy-preserving computation** with new tools, systems, and abstractions.

Acknowledgments

Students



Nicolas Küchler



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Alexander Viand



Miro Haller



Patrick Jattke



Christian Knabenhans

Sponsors

